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SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S CONVERSATION WITH
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HEUSGEN

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C) EUR Assistant Secretary Dan Fried met October 23 with German National Security Adviser Christoph Heusgen. They discussed Russia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Georgia, Turkey, and the Middle East.

Russia/2 2/MD/CFE:

12. (C) Heusgen noted that the Chancellor saw Russian President Putin October 14-15, a few days after the "2 2" meeting Secretaries Rice and Gates held in Moscow. Heusgen said the U.S. proposals must have surprised the Russians. Putin reportedly expressed to Merkel some skepticism about the sincerity of the U.S. offer, suggesting it was "just tactics" designed to keep the Europeans on the U.S. side, but he couldn't dismiss them out of hand. Heusgen pointed out that in the discussion, Presidential Adviser Prikhodko had chimed in with a more positive view of the U.S. proposals; Heusgen said that was the first time he had seen that happen.

13. (C) Heusgen said the U.S. had done a good job in recent months to turn the Missile Defense (MD) issue around. A/S Fried noted the good atmosphere of his meeting at NATO last week. Heusgen later said Putin was coming to the realization he could not split the EU and may be looking for a better approach.

Kosovo:

14. (C) Heusgen raised Kosovo and said we all had to move carefully. EU and U.S. Troika representatives Ischinger and Wisner had caught the Russians off-guard. Even Putin had told Merkel that Ischinger's ideas were serious. They had talked about different precedents, Serbia-Montenegro, the CIS (Heusgen said the CIS was a good model). Merkel reportedly told Putin that he should push Kostunica. Fried expressed our support for Ischinger but said that the outcome of the Troika process still was likely to be failure. Heusgen agreed; but if it was a 5 percent chance of success before, now it was perhaps 20 percent, he said.

15. (C) Heusgen expressed optimism about getting EU approval for the follow-on mission in Kosovo. He said the EU would need an invitation from the UNSYG to take it over, with UNSCR 1244 as the basis. The Greeks and Slovaks would go along

with that, Heusgen thought. Recognition of independence was a different question: Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia, and Greece were unlikely to recognize. Fried said it would be good if there were 21 EU members that recognized -- Heusgen thought that was achievable, even Spain.

¶16. (C) Fried and Heusgen agreed that it was advisable not to talk publicly about independence now. Heusgen said the U.S. needed to use its influence with the Kosovars so they would engage; they needed to understand that their interests were better served by an agreement. Fried said that was o.k. as long as it was understood by all that independence would be the result; if we waffled, there would be problems. He outlined contacts U/S Burns and he had had with the Kosovars on the margins of UNGA, in which the U.S. had been clear.

Macedonia:

¶17. (C) Heusgen raised Macedonia. Merkel had met Karamanlis recently -- the Greeks were furious about Macedonia, especially after an incident in which the UNGA President had announced them as "Macedonia" and not FYROM. There was extreme sensitivity in Greece; some in Skopje had the view that the U.S. would support them no matter what. Fried related U.S. contacts with Greek FM Bakoyannis in New York and Fried's subsequent engagement at the highest levels in Skopje. Heusgen said the Greeks claimed they would accept a "prefix" or modifier in front of "Macedonia" but Macedonian PM Gruevskiy rejected this. Fried said UN negotiator Nimetz remained active.

Georgia:

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¶18. (C) Heusgen raised Georgia, and Fried outlined U.S. support for a Georgia Membership Action Plan (MAP) at NATO. We recognized Germany's view. Fried underscored that it was important, in light of the work following the 2 2, to remember Georgia's key importance on CFE. The U.S. was working on this intensively. It was important that Georgia not feel isolated. Fried welcomed MFA PolDir Stanzel's recent comment to the USG that MAP for Georgia was not a question of "whether" but "when," and thought Stanzel's suggestion of a Georgian non-first-use of force declaration was significant, since it was the first time a German official was thinking of ways forward that included MAP.

¶19. (C) Heusgen said Berlin was dismayed by Saakashvili's handling of the Okruashvili accusation/arrest/confession. It looked "Stalinist." Germany agreed that Russia could not have a veto on NATO membership, but the Chancellor remained unconvinced on Georgia, and did not want to "import" unsolved crises into NATO. But she was willing to keep talking to the Georgians and had invited Saakashvili to Berlin (December 11) for a visit. It would be a second chance for Saakashvili to make a first impression, Heusgen quipped.

¶110. (C) Heusgen said Merkel was not as negative as Sarkozy on Georgia. Heusgen liked Levitte's idea of an offer to Georgia that contained the substance of MAP but without a "MAP" label. Fried said it was important to underscore the sense that Georgia belonged to our family and that its own evolution would determine how far and fast the relationship would go. It would be a mistake to convey somehow that Georgia was outside the transatlantic family and area of interest. Heusgen agreed with that.

Turkey:

¶111. (C) Fried noted that dealing with the Turks on NATO-EU would still be complicated. Heusgen pointed to the Merkel-Erdogan discussion in New York, in which Erdogan

reportedly had agreed to be flexible on EU-NATO in Kosovo. Heusgen asked for U.S. views on Turkey in light of the AGR and the problems in northern Iraq. Fried said we were still thinking; there might be ways to work around the problem.

Middle East/Annapolis:

¶12. (C) Heusgen said he was traveling to Saudi Arabia October 24, and the Saudi King would visit Germany November 7 -- Germany wanted to be helpful on the Middle East meeting in Annapolis, especially by helping get the Saudis to attend. Heusgen noted his recent discussion with A/S Welch in Jerusalem. The Palestinians (including Fayyad and Erekat) were telling him that this was the most committed they had seen the U.S. to progress in the MEPP. The U.S. was doing a good job, Heusgen said, and Merkel wanted to help.
TIMKEN JR